You CAN Reasonably Believe In Evolution, Even If You Don’t Understand It.

Living in the thrall of a post-modern (or perhaps even post-post-modern) society, it is difficult for regular people; even relatively clever regular people, to know what to believe and upon what basis to do so. In a climate which condemns criticism of other’s beliefs; sometimes even going so far as to call the very notion of objectivity a Western imperialistic anachronism, upon what grounds can one base their thinking? Couple this relativistic mind-set with the fact that the sheer level of complexity in modern human technology; science; and logic has reached such a high degree that to understand even one tiny corner of human-expertise takes years of difficult study, and to grasp all of it is a temporal impossibility. What then is the answer? Should we do as many already have and resign ourselves to the notion that we can never really know anything; and that therefore every claim – no matter how fantastical – is equally valid (some would even say: equally true)? Or is it still possible to rationally believe things about the world, thereby necessarily considering competing claims false?

I’m not going to focus on refuting relativism in this article. That’s been done to death – so much so in-fact that I would imagine the notion that relativism is a tenable position now exists only in the minds of laypeople (and how could any still actually existent relativist disagree with that claim anyway, given their thesis?). Rather, I will be focusing on the far more pressing and real issue of how a layperson can reasonably believe (or disbelieve) complex claims, despite neither knowing about; nor understanding, what makes them true (or false).

That might sound like a contradiction. How can one reasonably believe something when one doesn’t grasp the reasonable grounds for holding it to be true? This is precisely the thinking of those who hold that the correct position on evolution; or climate change (and to a lesser extent, on God or morality), is one of agnosticism. In their heads they follow the following line of thought: “I don’t have the slightest idea about ‘claim A’, nor what evidence exists for or against it, and indeed nor how that evidence should be interpreted.  Because I lack this understanding, I myself can neither reasonably refute those who support ‘claim A’, nor those who oppose it. Thus, my only choice is to neither accept nor reject ‘claim A’, and to consider its supporters, and its detractors, as equal”. Such thinking can appear very compelling, and thus any alternative can seem instantly dogmatic and unreasonable. This need not be the case.

Naturally, whether the thinking above; which we’ll call the agnostic position, is reasonable or not will depend on a number of different factors: what kind of claim is ‘claim A’; on what kind of basis do its supporters support it, and its detractors detract it; and are there further considerations that should be borne in mind? If ‘claim A’ is the position that ‘chocolate is nicer than cheese’, then arguably the agnostic position is the right one (easy cheese-lovers). Those that prefer chocolate to cheese do so because the taste of chocolate is favourable when they’re eating it; while those who prefer cheese detract from the claim because the taste of cheese is favourable when they’re eating that – but there really is no objective fact of the matter about whether it’s chocolate or cheese that IS more favourable when eaten – the very existence of the supporters and the detractors in this case refutes the claim. ‘Chocolate is nicer than cheese’ for those who prefer the taste of chocolate to cheese, and vice versa for those who prefer the reverse.

What if ‘claim A’ is the position that ‘Allah is the one true god’? Here the aforementioned factors become all important. Is the disagreement between two laypeople? Or between scientists or philosophers? Likewise, though the question looks like an ontological claim about the real-world existence of a god, identifiable as the one referred to in the Quran; in many cases this isn’t really how people treat a claim like this. Often it’s instead taken as something like ‘it would be beneficial if people believed that Allah was the one true god’. Thus we must also consider whether one or both sides is using scientific and philosophical arguments; or whether they’re arguing on the basis of religious texts; or by pointing out how people would be socially better or worse off if they believed Allah was the one true god? Given the many different forms that this argument could take, we’d have to first define the parameters of the debate before we reasonably assess how to judge it – something which is rarely spelt out when questions like this are posed at staged debates, usually resulting in them being a waste of time.

So what if the claim is both undeniably objective, and has its parameters clearly set – a scientific or philosophical claim? Suppose ‘claim A’ equates to ‘evolution is scientific fact’. Now consider again the aforementioned agnostic position. For the sake of argument – imagine you have no understanding of evolution; you don’t know the evidence in favour of it (or against it); and you can neither refute evolution’s supporters, nor its detractors. Do you now have no choice but to take up an agnostic position on evolution? No you do not, so long as you again consider the important factors. The so-called debate between evolution’s supporters and detractors is really nothing of the sort. One side employs genuine scientific argument, where the other utilises a mishmash of pseudo-science; exploited misunderstanding; quote-mining; emotive coercion; and slander. Moreover, taking into account surrounding considerations, we have the knowledge that evolution’s detractors are almost universally already enthralled to religious positions which (so they understand) require evolution to be false – thus they are hardly able to approach the position from an objective and neutral scientific standpoint. But what if you don’t even know that? What if you can’t distinguish creationist pseudo-science from genuine science? Even so, you are still able to rationally side with the proponents of the claim that ‘evolution is scientific fact’. How? By deferring to the relevant authority.

Such a claim will send shivers down the spine of any philosophically savvy reader. Is this not the fallacy of authority? No, it isn’t – for the following reason. One may not be aware of the huge amount of data relevant to evolutionary science; nor of the practical methods applied in testing and assessing it, but one is aware of the scientific methodology – the fundamental principles of good science – used by those who do understand evolutionary data. So long as one is aware of scientific methodology, can understand how it works as an objectively applicable method of discovering truth, and can be confident that the proponents (or detractors) of a claim are exclusively utilising it in their case – one can reasonably support that case despite not understanding the nitty-gritty details themselves. Indeed, it’s on this basis that the entire scientific infrastructure works. As science has exponentially grown in complexity, experts have become increasingly specialised, to the point at which it’s possible that one PhD level scientist can possess no-better than a layperson’s understanding of his colleagues work. If that first scientist wishes to use knowledge gained from his peer’s research, he can do so not because he understands the research itself, but because he knows that his peer gained that knowledge using the scientific method; coupled with his understanding of how the scientific method leads to truth.

What then of climate change? Unlike the evolutionary ‘debate’ – a battle between scientists and the religious or scientifically-confused, climate change appears to be a clash of scientists vs. scientists. How, as laypeople, are we to handle this case? With lesser confidence than with evolution, we have no choice but to again appeal to the authority of the experts (though in an importantly different way). Though climate change-sceptics may well be genuine scientists; and may also gain their data off the back of the scientific method – they are undeniably the overwhelming minority within the applicable scientific community[1]. If the vast majority of those who understand the data, and exclusively apply the scientific method in rationally reaching their conclusions, hold that human activity is a significant contributor to climate change – then we, who do not understand the data, but who do understand the scientific method; and can reasonably assume that it’s being exclusively applied[2], can rationally side with them. That’s not to mention the surrounding consideration of the suspect links between some climate change-sceptics and certain oil corporations.

Thus – just as one can reasonably take the medicine their doctor has given them, despite having no idea how it works – we can remain confident in scientific claims even if we don’t understand the nitty-gritty details of them ourselves. We do not have to remain agnostics in all areas for which we lack expertise; and we can still say with confidence that not everybody’s position is equally valid. For our part – we should ensure that we do understand the basics, like the scientific method; and learn the very important differences in the methodologies of scientists and philosophers, and theologians; politicians; and journalists. To rationally defer to an authority, you must be aware of what reasonably makes that person an authority in the first place; and you must also bear in mind that authority’s limits: a scientist is not necessarily an authority on ethics; and indeed – a geologist is no authority on evolution. Bear all that in mind, and we need not be a world of shoulder-shrugging agnostics.

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[1] From Wikipedia: “A poll performed by Peter Doran and Maggie Kendall Zimmerman at Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago received replies from 3,146 of the 10,257 polled Earth scientists. Results were analyzed globally and by specialization. 76 out of 79 climatologists who “listed climate science as their area of expertise and who also have published more than 50% of their recent peer-reviewed papers on the subject of climate change” believe that mean global temperatures have risen compared to pre-1800s levels, and 75 out of 77 believe that human activity is a significant factor in changing mean global temperatures. …

A summary from the survey states that: It seems that the debate on the authenticity of global warming and the role played by human activity is largely nonexistent among those who understand the nuances and scientific basis of long-term climate processes” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_opinion_on_climate_change#Doran_and_Kendall_Zimmerman.2C_2009

[2] Scientific infrastructure is extremely strict in ensuring this is the case, and enforces right application via the peer-review system.

Christmas Thinkings

It’s been a while since I’ve written anything here and so, as you’d expect, I have a backlog of things that desperately need saying. Who knows what’d happen if I weren’t to write them all down here – I have a few ideas… but I won’t trouble you with them since I am going to write – now. Right now. Write here, right now. Ignore that and keep reading.

Did you really think illegal downloading wasn’t a crime? You didn’t? You know it’s stealing, right? Then why the rage, old chum?

Are you a filthy thieving downloading piece of scum? If so, Peter Mandelson is after you. Mandy hopes to push through a plan that would see the web connections of Internet pirates disconnected – a move that has met quite considerable condemnation from the young and tech. savvy members of the British populace (you know: the ones who do most of the downloading). Here I don’t wish to focus on whether or not Mandelson’s plan is practical; nor whether it could even be properly applied without risking punishment to those who have genuinely done no wrong (having had their internet connections high-jacked, for example). No – what confuses me in this case is the genuine outrage, shown by those who participate in the illegal filesharing practice, to this decision. Their condemnation isn’t directed at the unworkable nature of Mandelson’s plan; nor at any other factor related to implementation. Rather, they’re disgust is aimed squarely at the suggestion, the mere idea, that those who steal intellectual property via the Internet should be punished for their legally acknowledged crimes. Now don’t get me wrong – I’m not myself condemning filesharing here (and neither am I supporting it). Like an adolescent, zit-covered David Cameron attempting to smoke a poorly constructed spliff, I must confess to having partaken in the practice in my early teenage years. It was a given to fourteen-year-olds in those Napster days – and then it was just music, with each megabyte taking at least a minute to download. Now films; TV series; games; software; and even operating systems can be downloaded in but a small number of hours. And many, many, many people are doing it. “Good luck to them” you might say, “it doesn’t affect the multimillion pound music / film / games industry anyway” you might rhetorically continue. I’m not entirely sure you’re right, but fair enough. As crimes go, downloading ‘Fight For This Love’ by Cheryl Cole is nothing major (well, the filesharing part isn’t), but come now: certainly it is still a crime. Whatever you think of the people who own the data you’re stealing – however rich they are – and however little your theft will affect them, you are still undeniably committing a crime: the crime of theft. You can’t legitimise stealing a millionaire’s doormat by pointing out that he’s rich and can easily afford the loss. The shoplifter’s excuse that the supermarket won’t suffer, and that it accounts for the existence of thieves, goes no way towards morally or legally legitimising their actions. And don’t pretend that your filesharing is in anyway justifiable on a kind of Robin Hood-esque basis – I’d wager that you could afford whatever you’re stealing – and if you can’t, I’d certainly doubt that you strictly needed it. As I said, I’m not here to rain moral condemnation down on anybody. I’ve benefited from the filesharing of others. I’ve taken part in it years ago. And I don’t particularly think worse of those who I know still do it. But it is crime. It is theft. And, like a shoplifter, surely the response to being caught out must be to put one’s hands up and say “fair enough” – not to bleat on about how evil Peter Mandelson is for trying to uphold our country’s laws. Few pickpockets have arrived at the police station only to erupt into a fuming tirade over how despicable it is to restrict their freedom to pick pockets – even if they stuck exclusively to the superrich.

‘Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2’. Yeah, it glorifies terrorism you know. Yeah seriously… No, it does! …No it doesn’t you impetuous pawn.

The largest ever entertainment release – Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 – is now available, and is being enjoyed by countless millions of gamers the world over, some responsible; some stupid; some clever; some mature; some hopelessly childish; some (due to awful parenting) actually children; some PhD students; some secondary school dropouts, and so on and so forth. Why is this game in particular important? Well – because it features one of the most controversial sections of a videogame to date (so controversial in fact that the game asks you if you want to skip it before you even start playing). For those who are interested in seeing more or less exactly what happens in the game, watch the video below (but note the spoiler):

The scene has the player, along with three or four non-playable characters, casually enter an airport in Moscow and open fire on the unarmed civilians there-in. The civilians flee, the player’s character and the others continue to fire. Security guards are easily cut down, as are people trying to help injured others to their feet. Wounded people try to crawl away only to be shot in the back, and by the end of the level the player leaves the airport with a bloodbath in his wake. The context is that the player’s character is a member of an elite military task force, who goes undercover in a terrorist organisation in order to bring down their highly dangerous leader. In order to stay undercover, he’s forced to take part in the airport massacre – and, like him, you the player must actually be there pulling the trigger – there’s no escape from liability in the form of a cutscene, you actively take part in the entire section of the game – every murdered civilian falls as a result of you genuinely opting to pull the trigger with your crosshairs aimed squarely at their backs. Controversial enough for you? Predictably, both sides have gone to war, competing to see who can provide the more painfully inane argument. On the anti-COD (Call of Duty) side, we have suggestions that the game is excessively violent; glorifies terrorism and killing; and might influence others to behave in the way the game portrays, while the pro-CODers spout the usual ‘it’s just a game’; ‘it’s not real’; and ‘you don’t have to play it if you don’t like it’ rubbish. Let’s be clear – in the form of the preceding arguments, both sides are wrong. With regard to the anti-CODers – the game is not excessively violent. To be excessively violent would be to include violence that was inaccurate to the realities of the situation (i.e. war and terrorism). The game doesn’t do this, and is certainly less gory (and bloody) than a number of other, far less controversial, titles currently available. It categorically does not glorify war or terrorism – war itself is presented as chaotic and terrifying, and the terrorism scene is one of the most uncomfortable and troubling portrayals that I’ve ever come across, in any form of artistic media, succeeding dramatically where many other games have tried and failed. It positively didn’t promote the idea that acting as the character does in the game might be ‘fun’ or ‘cool’; and no more glorified callous murder than did Schindler’s List. The pro-CODers are just as wrong. The fact COD:MW2 is a game, and not real, does not thereby earn it a free-reign to portray just about anything it wants. There is a reason the BBFC exists, and it’s not simply to calm the constantly raging tempers of the Daily Mail reading masses. It is certainly possible that COD could have portrayed the terrorism scene unacceptably. If the game had suggested that terrorism were a good thing – or if it had made mocking reference to a real life murder – or if it had screwed up in any number of other possible ways, the BBFC would have been well within their rights to condemn it. A game in which you play a jolly paedophile who has to search out and abuse children in exchange for points to spend on your computer rig would not be acceptable – despite the fact that ‘it would be a game’ and ‘it wouldn’t be real’. The same applies to the suggestion that you don’t have to play it if you don’t want to. This idiot excuse comes out of modern relativism, and the idea that rightness and wrongness apply no further than one’s own personal feelings. The idea is that if COD:MW2 is wrong ‘for you’, then there is nothing necessarily compelling you to play it. However, you have no right to assume it’s wrong ‘for other people’, who themselves are free to play so long as they don’t force you to watch. Again, this is utter nonsense – if Infinity Ward (the game’s developers) had done wrong, I’d be just as correct to condemn them, despite not having fallen victim to their crime, as I would to be to condemn a murderer, despite not having suffered his. Moral condemnation can still be applied by those who aren’t directly affected – hence the existence of our (or any) legal system. So who’s right? Well – ultimately, it’s the pro-CODers, though not due to any of the previously mentioned ‘arguments’. The game’s terrorist scene is handled maturely and frankly, and is a complete success in its goal of leaving the player feeling awkward; uncomfortable; and utterly disgusted (at their own actions, not at the game’s inclusion of the level). Contrary to (one of my heroes) Charlie Brooker’s suggestion, I felt the interactivity of the scene was completely justified, managing to create an atmosphere and sensation that just would not have been possible via a cutscene portrayed utterly outside of the player’s control (as has been the case with a number of games featuring ‘moral choices’). If there’s a negative point to be made it’s that the rest of the game’s campaign fails to be anywhere near as absorbing, and the plot as a whole struggles to be engrossing or involving, which is a shame given that the fundamental ideas are very good. Thus, the terrorist scene sort of just pops-up, not particularly in context, and not captivating in the sense of it bringing you any deeper into the plot – but that’s not a condemnation of its highly successful content; just as a bad war film wouldn’t, in its struggling storytelling, thereby delegitimise its inclusion of battle footage. COD:MW2’s terrorist scene is legitimate, justified in its inclusion and interactivity, rightly available (to adults) in the UK, and utterly horrible all the same.

Christmas time. Mistletoe and whine. I hope the adverts start in June next year.

It’s exactly a month until Christmas today – the day of the birth of our Lord. And what I want to write about here is how damned annoying it is that everyone’s forgotten about how it’s HIS day, and how we need to be honouring Him! Oh, and about the Jews… Not really… Christmas nowadays is nothing to do with Jesus, or Christianity, and that’s a very good thing. It has, quite naturally and without cultural intervention, evolved into a time that genuinely belongs to all people (or any that want it). Sure, there are the moaners: those who say it’s nought but a materialistic free-for-all – a time for retailers to exploit shoppers, and for children to exploit parents, and for DFS to exploit everybody – and there are those who whinge that “boo-hoo the adverts are on even earlier this year!” or that “Tesco’s are playing Christmas music, and it’s only October!” as if the sight of a Christmas tree on TV, or the sound of Noddy Holder’s horrible, horrible, voice exclaiming “it’s Christmas!” causes them internal bleeding, or something else worthy of such persistent complaint. Well to those people I say: “shut your faces you miserable bloody stupid gits” (and I’d encourage you to use the same phrase). Of course Christmas is utilised by shops trying to sell their wares; and of course children get overly covetous when they see an opportunity to get some toy they’ve been yearning for (since they saw the advert in October); and yes everybody (apart from tirelessly joyous w*nkers) loathes Christmas music – - But it’s no worse than JLS’ or Ndubz’ mindless Casio keyboard adapted ‘beats’, which were playing previously! And contrary to what the moaners suggest, the adverts aren’t on all THAT early – it’s not as if they’re so constant that we can’t even tell Christmas time apart, from, say, Easter (which starts in about February by the advert calendar, leaving January as a useful buffer for those of us who set our watches by commercial campaigns). Yes Christmas, as a retailing / self-serving / annoying / marketing time extends from late September to New Years, and yes, if you must, you can count that as a negative. But look too at the positives. Who, but the most jaded, or the most unfortunate (the former who have themselves to blame, the latter who obviously don’t), doesn’t have fond memories of at least a few of their Christmases? For whom has some Christmas not been a particularly special time – at some point in their pitiful little lives? I’m talking about the actual day here – when the children’s greed has done its job, and when the retailers are out of time, and when nobody goes to the shops to listen to awful Christmas music because they’re all closed. On Christmas day, December 25^th itself, it is a truly happy and special occasion. This is so, for despite complaints, the massive build up does actually manage its purpose, and Christmas day is left feeling like a genuinely satisfying climactic event. Everyone feels a happy obligation to make an effort to enjoy the day rather than let it pass by unnoticed (apart from the most awful people on the planet). Children are happy, friends and family are united, work and daily life temporarily cease, and – if you do it right – peace and good will truly do extend to all men (…in your local vicinity, the war continues, despite yuletide). It’s nothing to do with Jesus (for most); and it’s nothing to do with the Winter solstice, as was the case in the Pagan festival the Christians initially commandeered; and indeed why should it be? What more beautiful a thing to have Christmas in its current carnation; as a time when families and friends unite to try and enjoy each other’s company, to make one another happy via generous gifts, to reflect on the year and the positives in life; than to worship a long dead carpenter (or builder, apparently carpenter’s a mistranslation). Stop complaining about Christmas – even if you do hate the adverts, or the music, or the lights, or the children’s happy laughter. There was a time when you were that six year old, looking forward to a day of toys; games; and grandma – and if you get over your melodramatic self-pity – you might just learn to enjoy it all over again.

Twitter is for Twits, if you spell it wrong.

Twitter confuses me. If I had come up with the idea for it, I’d have rejected it instantly and never told anyone else about it. However, judging by the runaway success of the (sort of) social networking app. it seems my rejection would have been a huge mistake (at least in terms of my finances). Why is this, and what does it mean for those who use it; and our modern society in general? What are Twitter’s cultural connotations?

First of all, what is Twitter? Well, as mentioned previously, it markets itself as a social networking site; like Facebook; that allows its users to post short status updates of 140 characters or less (compared to the 160 of a text message). That’s it. That’s the full extent of Twitter. You can follow other people’s ‘tweets’ (the bird brained connotations being highly appropriate in most cases); and they in turn can follow yours. But that is it. If you can’t transmit your message; whether openly mundane, or strivingly profound; in 140 characters – you’re using the wrong social networking app.

Now what does this entail? Given only 140 characters to work with, what possible function can Twitter updates serve? This is the key point. You can’t transmit a meaningful message in 140 characters (try summarising Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason by SMS); you can barely say a thing. Of course, you can post a link to somewhere else where there’s more room; but that kind of misses the point. The fact is that Twitter provides the ability to post short sound bites (or text bites). These sound bites are necessarily brief and non-exhaustive – they state an ultimate conclusion; but have no room for justification or detail. Thus, their value rests on their slickness – their quotability. Now obviously I’m talking here of the marginally more interesting tweets – not the ones that state drivel like “just went Subway – was good” (which inexplicably still draw interest if written by a minor celebrity). For those conversationally; culturally; hell: entirely, pointless tweets – 140 characters is more than enough room. Indeed, if you listen in on a ‘conversation’ between a bunch of moron riff-raff youths on a bus, assuming you pick anything up over the audible ordure pumping out of their mobile phones, you’ll find that 140 character sentences are plenty to communicate anything they might wish to bark. No, I mean communications someone of interest might have to say: a high-brow comedian; a politician; an academic; a well-respected social commentator. How can these people use Twitter to say anything worthwhile?

They can’t. Even if they have the greatest; most insightful; and most rationally sound point to communicate, all they can do is input the final five or six word conclusion – and then the masses can cheer or boo as they’re thoughtless prejudices see fit. There’s no way a proper point can be made on Twitter – of the mechanisms available for idea transmission – only manipulation (via charismatic wording) is available. Is that all people want nowadays? Is it all their attention spans can bear?

This, I think, is the key point. Of course it’s possible to find thought out discussion on complex subjects; it’s possible to find column inches explaining the details of political manifestos, and highlighting their flaws; it’s possible to find long and detailed cases arguing necessarily complex points – but most people can’t be bothered. Most would rather a brief soundbite, a 140 character message, which they can either approve or disapprove of depending on their pre-existing bias. Without justification; and without reason; without value as anything more than a primitive hoot to excite or enrage the masses. On the back of such paucity of information, moronic conversations are run; votes are cast; and society – from the highest political office, to the lowest chip-shop brawl – remains well and truly buggered. That’s what Twitter is – the all pervading laziness and reasonless impressionability of the modern world.

Whales. Chat. Prostitutes

I’m getting dangerously close to abandoning this blog, which is something that I very much don’t want to do. That being so I’m still uninspired, unfortunately, by any of the latest events or discoveries that I’ve come across since my older (better) posts – or at least, not inspired enough to write anything substantial; in length or quality.

As such, I’ve decided here not even to bother trying. Instead, I’ll share two smaller observations I’ve made over the last week or so and flippantly discuss them in a way that will provide a small insight into my thinking and, more importantly, take up essential column inches.

1: Is Saving the Whale Compassionate?

The title here refers to whales, but really I’m talking about any attempt to save a sentient; non-human animal species. As such, this article covers polar bears; rhinoceroses; manatees; tigers; and any other animals that have been the subject of campaigns to save their species from extinction. My question is this: in what way can saving a species from extinction be considered ‘compassionate’ (by which I mean the opposite of cruel) when a species qua ‘species’ is not sentient – is unconscious – and thereby is unable to suffer any cruelty to be (compassionately) saved from? Now let me explain. Any individual sentient animal can suffer cruelty – can experience pain – and (so long as you’re not a nit-picking philosopher) can suffer. As such, any individual sentient animal (including of course any individual sentient human animal) can be compassionately saved (from cruelty; or death; or whatever). Thus, they would be legitimate subjects of ‘compassionate’ campaigns to save them. However, those who wish to save species that are close to extinction aren’t in the business of compassionately saving individual members. This is obvious due to the fact that imminent species extinction is their motivating factor; and that species close to extinction are their sole focus. As such, what Tarquin the ‘Save the Whales’ campaigner is interested in is retaining samples of whale species on the planet, not in saving any individual whales themselves. That’s why he’s campaigning for whales and not for cows (who, like whales, have individual members of their species ‘go extinct’ daily). In short, Tarquin wants something to exist in the world that the designator “whale” would be applicable to, nothing more and nothing less. Now how can this desire be rightly described as compassionate? Tarquin’s goal (in his campaigning) is not to prevent cruelty to anyone capable of suffering it; it is to retain the applicable application of a concept: that of ‘whale’ in this case, to something in this world. The concept of ‘whale’ (which is what defines the species, since it’s the applicable application of the concept to all individual members that render them members of that species) is incapable of suffering cruelty, and cannot be treated compassionately (only its members can). As such, saving it can’t be compassionate – it’s a category mistake of sorts. Therefore, those who campaign to save animals close to extinction aren’t displaying compassion at all – only a desire to retain the earthly applicability of a vast variety of different concepts. Right?

2: Is Watching Maury Worse Than Visiting a Prostitute?

For those who don’t know, Maury is an American chat show host who specialises (even more than the many competitors) in displaying especially dumb Americans discovering that their idiot husbands, who have cheated on them four times before, are cheating on them again – despite having sworn (since their last appearance on the show) to “always be true” (or stuff in that vein). The stories are stupid and stupefying; and the people are even more so, and thus, naturally, everyone who’s watching finds the Maury show’s moron parade hysterical, and in the case of the studio audience, aren’t afraid to show it. But hang on one cotton-picking minute here. Yes, Luaqtishwa, the blubbering woman currently on stage whinging about her sister’s seven children all fathered by her own husband: Quan is, an idiot. But she’s still human. She still has feelings. And she’s patently quite distraught with her discovery that her husband has shockingly been playing away again (remember she’s an idiot). The Maury show makes even less effort than other similar shows to suggest that it’s really ‘there to help’. Guests are wheeled in an out in brief segments where they reveal their suspicions; have them proven right; weep hysterically; and then get wheeled out to a chorus of excited hoots and laughter from the delinquent audience. It’s a hideous circus, where it becomes patently clear how much the Victorian freak-show spirit still flourishes so long as it’s thinly veiled under a justification of ‘helping people’. Where’s the link with prostitution? Well, first of all let me say that questions on the ethics of prostitution are big ones, that aren’t easily answered. Aside from worries about exploitation by pimps and beatings etc., the key problem people seem to have with prostitution is that it’s a patent objectifying of the poor women involved in it. It’s an exploitation of them as mere bodies – as living sex dolls – that exist only to gratify the sexual urges of seedy men. Now what are the guests on the Maury show? Are they not simple objects of derision – living jokes? The woman on stage is there because she’s stupid enough to believe a man who constantly abuses her trust; and because she’s going to cry when Maury reveals further hurtful realities to her – and that’s funny. That is her function in the eyes of the studio audience; and presumably those of the audience at home. She exists to gratify the hunger for hilarity of her seedy and grotesque peers. Is that really any better than buying a call girl? Maybe it’s worse.

There you are. (I’ll be back later)

Enough with the “Militant Atheism” label, you ‘Relativist Militia’

Over the last few years, it has been impossible to avoid the phrase: militant atheist. You will find it almost anywhere, from respectable left-wing newspapers to late night Channel 5 ‘discussion’ shows to scientific journals to philosopher’s blogs. It’s seemingly extremely flexible; being applied in many highly divergent circumstances, and is as effective in closing the ears of the woolly-minded left of Britain as the term ‘infidel’ is in doing the same to the religiously conservative of Iran. What then does it mean?

The ‘atheist’ part seems fairly obvious as ‘one who doesn’t believe in the existence of a god’, although as I’ve mentioned in previous articles – even this is open to more than one interpretation. It can be taken either, simply and literally, as one who lacks the positive belief in a god’s existence; or alternatively as one who possesses the positive belief in the non-existence of a god. And even that latter possibility is still further prone to differing interpretations as either one who considers it more evidentially reasonable to assume there is no god (as we assume the moon doesn’t have a gold core due to lack of evidence and circumstantial evidence to the contrary, despite not being 100% logically certain) to one who does consider themselves 100% certain that no god exists.

If you’re being fair and reasonable – the only interpretation you can positively attributed to someone the moment they inform you that they are an atheist is the first: someone who lacks a positive belief in a god’s existence. This is because such an interpretation is both a necessary condition of being accurately labelled an atheist, and a sufficient condition since it is in itself enough to render someone an atheist. In order for you to add one of the further conditions such as the degree of certitude and / or reasonableness, you will require further information.

What about the ‘militant’ part. This summons images of mobilisation and iron fisted force. Need it? Strictly speaking: ‘no’. The dictionary definition is: vigorously active and aggressive, esp. in support of a cause[1]. One can be vigorously active and still rational and non-coercive. Aggressive is more of a stretch, though I suppose the term might just be shoe-horned into describing a highly passionate debater such as T. H. Huxley supporting evolution against Samuel Wilberforce. Thus, if one so desires, the term ‘militant’ can be understood to mean ‘passionate and vigorous’ with no connotations of dominance or violence. Few, however, would seriously opt for using it in such a fashion. You are unlikely to read of ‘militant Oxfam supporters’; ‘militant peace protestors’; or ‘militant aids charity workers’ unless in reference to riots instigated by one of these groups, and yet if the term was intended to mean only ‘passionate and vigorous’ then there should be no reason why not. As such, I think it is fair to say that the intentions of those who throw the term ‘militant’ in relation to atheists (or anyone else for that matter) around, do so with the notion of force and (at least verbal) coercion in mind.

If I am right, and this is the intention of those who use the term ‘militant’, then its connection to the term ‘atheist’ will in all likelihood be with reference to one of the latter interpretations mentioned above. It is just conceivable how someone who simply lacks a positive belief in a god could be militant about such a position, if they wished to coerce others into relinquishing their own positive beliefs in a god’s existence or lack-of for example, however it’s unlikely given the fact that anyone who held this position must clearly lack the interest in the subject to have examined the evidence (or rhetorical propaganda) and subsequently come down on one side: either as someone with a positive belief in a god’s existence; or someone with a positive belief (to some degree) in the non-existence of god(s). Thus, when you hear or read the term ‘militant atheist’, it’s very likely being applied to someone who possesses a positive belief in the non-existence of god(s). The question is whether or not that’s a fair label.

For many, hearing the phrase ‘a positive belief in the non-existence of god(s)’ will be enough to convince them that the term ‘militant’ is already half way towards being totally appropriate. After all – here we have someone who claims not just to not believe in god, but to also believe that no god exists. How could someone have come to such a position without having long surrendered reason and taken up a position of faith: that is a ‘faith’ in the non-existence of god(s)? This is the thinking that lies behind the now common ‘argument’ of the religious, which states: ‘yes, we have faith that there’s a god – but you have faith that there’s no god, and as such, since we both believe on faith, our two positions are equally legitimate’. If a person openly admits to such a position (a positive belief in the non-existence of god, not ’faith’ in such a belief), and communicates it to others, perhaps even with the intention of having them take up the same position, then surely they’re clearly being militant. How then could anyone object to the term ‘militant atheist’?

Here’s how. If a positive belief in the non-existence of god(s) was a position that could only be held on faith – that is, that couldn’t be given a rational footing – then yes: the only manner by which others could be brought to accept it would be some form of coercion or manipulation. This is so since, without a rational grounding, persuasion (reasoned argument) could not possibly be effective in having others accept the position. One (person A) can’t persuade another human being (person B) that they (person B) are a horse since it would be irrational for them (person B) to believe this. The only way by which one could have someone accept the proposition that they were a horse would be to either coerce or manipulate them into believing it: to play on their deep desire to be a horse until their psyche were to give in to the strain, for example. Thus, if atheists with a positive belief in the non-existence of god(s) (from now on: positive-atheists) were believing on faith and were attempting to bring others round to the same position then necessarily they would be employing coercion and/or manipulation and as such the term ‘militant’ may well be appropriate (presumably they’d have to be rather passionate in their task too for the term to sit perfectly).

The problem for the militant-atheist shouting crowd is that the positive-atheist position need not at all be a faithful one, and this can be seen quite clearly as soon as one recognises the distinction I mentioned above between interpreting the positive-atheist position as one where it is considered more evidentially reasonable to assume there is no god and one where it is considered 100% logically certain that no god exists. Anyone holding the latter interpreted position is faithful: exactly as faithful as the religious. This is so because there exists no evidence (and seemingly no philosophical argument) that would render it a logical certainty that no god(s) exist, just as there is no evidence (and again, no philosophical argument) that would render it a logical certainty that god(s) do exist, as the religious claim to believe. Part of the reason why this is so is because of the intensely vague definition of ‘god’ – by which many people mean many different things and which thereby eludes disproving via infinite metamorphosis; however the bigger reason is that none (or perhaps almost none) of our empirical (sense-informed) beliefs are logical certainties. Since science deals solely in empirical facts, this means that nothing (or perhaps almost nothing) that science reveals is a logical certainty. Does this entail that there are no scientific facts? No, it does not!

Because of the reasons outlined above, there are very few positive-atheists of the logical certainty variety (here-on: faithful-atheists), and certainly none among those most commonly labelled ‘militant atheists’. And yet there are many positive-atheists that do hold the positive belief that no god(s) exist on the basis that science and philosophy heavily imply this to be so (here-on: reasonable-atheists). Does it make sense for reasonable-atheists to hold a positive belief that no god(s) exists, despite lacking certainty (like the faithful-atheists; or the religious in the reverse direction)? Yes, it does – given that it is by the same means that they hold the beliefs that gravity exists; that water’s chemical makeup is H2O; that flowers photosynthesise; that evolution by natural selection explains species; that the earth is round; and that every other scientifically established fact is indeed, a fact. What are these means? Evidence scrutinised under the scientific method, and reason. It may not be a logical certainty that flowers photosynthesise, but given its overwhelming support by the evidence, and place within a rational explanation of the functioning of flowers and the ecosystem, it is still a fact. Thus, one is rational to believe that plants photosynthesise, and irrational to belief otherwise, despite lacking logical certitude. In the exact same way, one is rational to hold a positive belief in the non-existence of any interactive gods due to their lack of explanative function in our understanding of the causal universe – and to a lesser extent: deist gods, who are hewn down not with empirical evidence, but by Ockham’s razor.

As it is rational for reasonable-atheists to hold their position (unlike faithful-atheists; or the religious), it is perfectly possible for them to attempt to bring others round with persuasion rather than coercion or manipulation. As such, no matter how passionate the reasonable-atheist, as long as persuasion (reasoned argument) is employed (rather than coercion or manipulation) the term ‘militant atheist’ will never be appropriate. Is this what we find? Take any one of Richard Dawkins’ television programmes; his book: ‘The God Delusion’; his radio appearances, or as far as I know, any other instance of him discussing atheism and you will find only passionate reasoned debate.

Why is the term ‘militant atheist’ employed if it is so totally inappropriate? For the very reasons which justify Dawkins’; Harris’; Hitchens’ et al.’s passionate and public outspokenness. Many of us hold an unjustified reverence and respect for religion that needs to be removed if we’re to eliminate belief that ‘faith’ is good. As an extension, many fear that they lack the reasoning ability to defend religious belief or the beliefs and positions which it entails (anti-abortion; homophobia; halal and kosher killing methods; abstinence; and jihad are all possibilities). It is easier to label those who reason against religion as ‘militant atheists’, thereby sweeping them aside as some fringe group that need not be addressed, than to face them earnestly with the possibility of being proven wrong. I hope that, in time, people will overcome this cowardice and genuinely put their beliefs on the line. There is less to lose than they may realise, and far more to gain.

 

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[1] http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/militant

The Burning of the Rainbow Flag

The decision was recently taken to offer sex education in all primary and secondary schools throughout the country. Though sillier parents will retain their ability to withdraw their children from such lessons, by and large the decision was a wholly good and rational one, not least because the law will also apply to so called ‘faith’ schools.

There is one issue however, implicit in the concession that ‘faith’ schools should be able to provide the lessons within the ethos of their own belief-set, and that is that the unfortunate children receiving their education from these ‘faith’ establishments will still suffer the ungrounded leanings of their parent’s and teacher’s religions – worst of all: their prejudices against homosexuality.

 

It seems phenomenal that in this country, from which sprang much of the liberal thought which grounds the free world; where gay marriage is a legal reality; and where people of all sexes and sexualities are supposedly enjoying equal rights, it should remain possible to teach, in government funded establishments, the scientific fallacy that homosexuality is unnatural, and the ethical fallacy that it is immoral.

 

That, however, is not the primary focus of this article. Despicable as it is that the aforementioned should remain teachable, I believe there is a further; deeper; sour element implicit in this concession which, despite how disgusting the sanctioning of homophobic education is, remains all the more despicable: and that is the inconsistency of the concession. While decisions can still be made to allow religious establishments to spout homophobia, to openly condemn homosexuals as immoral and hell-bound; the same organisations must pussyfoot very carefully around rival religions, never openly condemning their followers to hell, despite the fact that their various religious books are far more vocal on the ‘immorality’ of following false religions than on finding members of your own sex attractive.

 

If the justification for the continued acceptance of homophobia is respect for the religious belief-sets of the ‘faithful’, then why does the same respect not also sanction the open condemnation of rival religions? Chronicles 2 15:13 states:

 

“That whosoever would not seek the LORD God of Israel should be put to death, whether small or great, whether man or woman.”

 

And the New Testament is just as vocal, as for example, in Mark 16:16:

 

“He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned.”

 

The Koran is also candid in its condemnation of unbelievers, for example, in The Cow 2:6-2:7:

 

“As for Disbelievers, Whether thou warn them or thou warn them not it is all one for them; they believe not.

 

Allah hath sealed their hearing and their hearts, and on their eyes there is a covering. Theirs will be an awful doom.”

 

If the babblings of ancient religious texts is enough to justify teaching young children that homosexuality is immoral and unnatural, why does it not also justify the open teaching that those from rival religions should, at best: be constantly warned of their impending damnation; or at worst: be ostracised, or even put to death? Why does the religious respect card work in one hand, but not the other? It’s almost as if the government were saying that intolerance of other religions is worse than intolerance of other sexualities – but that can’t be right, can it?

 

Ironically, this decision mirrored a despicable move made by the company I recently concluded work for. Without giving too much away (for NDA purposes), the company offered means of communication between a large community via the internet, and as such was required to regulate the dialogue that occurred within the community – dishing out punishments wherever the company perceived necessary.  These punishments came in the form of black-marks – a specific number of which would lead to mutes or bans, both temporary and permanent. Before I finished my time with this specific organisation, they internally released their new guidelines on what was to be punished, and to what degree. It transpired that, though racial or religious prejudice was to be punished severely, with half the black-marks needed for a ban to be applied for any occurrence of either; sexist or homophobic prejudice was to be an entirely optional punishment, and if applied at all, was not to exceed the minimum number of black marks – something in the region of a twentieth of those needed for a ban.

 

What was the message here? That the rights of the homosexual community to avoid persecution were a tenth as important as the rights of the Indian or Muslim communities? The principles of this huge organisation were loose and inconsistent to say the least, and it is shameful that such a company would hold such an influential position with so many young people, however it is just downright embarrassing to see the British government mirror their decision.

 

I understand the fear that exists in the current climate surrounding anything that may anger the religious. With the relatively recent outbursts; the growing religious zeal around the world; and the expanding divergent religious groups in this small country, it is understandable that the government, and society as a whole, should feel an element of fear and trepidation when it comes to dealing with the various wails of the myriad religious organisations. However, we must not let that fear lead us to surrender hard fought liberal values, and we should resist at all costs the stifling of our ability to openly criticise, and deny the demands of, those religious beliefs which offend reason and morality to the extent to which those mentioned here-in have.  

Nublasphemy

The notion of blasphemy has never been more successfully parodied than in Monty Python’s best and most seminal film: ‘The Life of Brian’. In TLOB, a stoning takes place of a man who has blasphemed by exclaiming that his supper was ‘good enough for Jehovah’. Before the sorry affair can begin, the adjudicator of the stoning is forced to calm the crowd, who repeatedly erupt into overeager tirades of stone throwing whenever anyone mentions ‘Jehovah’. Nothing gets done – least of all the punishment of the accused – because of the crowd’s constant outbursts whenever the word ‘Jehovah’ is spoken.

The scene illustrates the ludicrousness of blasphemy perfectly. On the one hand there is the downright absurdity of ‘moral’ outrage at the speaking of some pedestal-placed word, even in such a mundane and non-offensive context as within reference to a pleasant supper. On the other, there is the irrationality and un-productivity of condemning something supposedly offensive by out-shouting and attempting to silence it rather than attempting to reason why exactly it’s unacceptable.

Likewise, this lunacy still exists in the real world, with the shockingly dumb ‘moral’ outrage that exploded after the Brass Eye paedophile special in 2001. Here was a television programme which parodied not the experiences and ordeals of the victims of paedophilia, but the paranoia of the tabloid media and the attitudes of the low-brow public, not to mention the idiocy and / or shameless sycophancy of those in positions of authority who attempt to curry favour with the more witless members of society. Indeed, the real world reaction deliciously matched the one mocked in the programme, with crusades and explosions of disgust from the likes of The Daily Mail, and condemnations from (no-doubt only Straussian…) idiot politicians who had not even seen the show.*

What’s the difference between the first case and the second? True: the first is ‘religious-blasphemy’. It’s the traditional definition of blasphemy as the speaking of God’s name in vain (which apparently he’s very sensitive about). This kind of blasphemy includes many now commonly heard words (in this country at least) such as: ‘Jesus’; ‘damn’; ‘Christ’ and ‘hell’, and is considered by most to be more or less inert. Sure, we may bite our tongues when we’re among devout people; and some feel a temporary re-emergence of reverence for these words when they’re feeling vulnerable, however for most people most of the time, my blog title: ‘damn their lies’ is not to be read as an affront to God (or at least, it’d be the phrase as a whole if it was, not just the first word).

The second case is not religious-blasphemy, but rather an example of ‘new-blasphemy’, or ‘nublasphemy’ as I’m opting to spell it as it looks more po-mo. If you want to moan your head off about ‘damn taxes’; or exclaim ‘Jesus Christ!’ when you hit your finger with a hammer, then by all means go ahead, but DON’T YOU DARE mention paedophilia; Islam-o-phobia; Holocaust denial; the activities of animal rights ‘extremists’ – without the requisite moral condemnation. For God’s sakes (see, you didn’t even flinch) at the very least, don’t discuss these things without making clear that they’re unquestioningly abysmal, and NOT to be thought otherwise… by anyone.

What is the source of nublasphemy? Are people afraid that, without constant blunt reminders of how terrible these things are they’ll forget and accidentally start supporting them? Do they fear that others will think them Nazis should they waiver in their hard-lined condemnation of the publication of books denying the Holocaust? Perhaps, are they lacking confidence in their ability to rationally support the condemnation of the positions which they so whole heartedly denounce? Who could blame them? Nevertheless, nublasphemy is too dangerous a thing to be left unchallenged.

I’ve already given a paedophile example, so let’s move on to ‘Islam-o-phobia’: a new watchword for the ‘morally-righteous’. I’ve seen this word come up a number of times, including in newspapers as respectable as The Guardian. It usually arises with reference to people who are supposedly exhibiting it, or along with the question of how to get rid of it, such as ‘the type of Islam-o-phobia exhibited by Person X exists throughout Organisation Y’ or ‘the government hopes that these measures will go some way to eliminating Islam-o-phobia’.

Now let me make clear – prejudice by its very meaning, is irrational. If one pre-judges something, anything, then they are assigning it properties without sufficient evidence, and as such are forming beliefs which aren’t justified. Prejudice is stupid. If reference to Islam-o-phobia were purely restricted to instances where people or organisations were assigning negative (or otherwise) properties to Islam, or Muslim people in general, without any perceived rational justification whatsoever for doing so, then the term would be perfectly acceptable.

The problem arises when the term is applied to those who do believe that they have a reasonable case for assigning particular negative characteristics to Islam, or the behaviour of those who act in its service. It’s one thing to condemn some brute that stabs an innocent kid coming out of a Mosque simply because he hates the look of ‘Pakis’; it’s quite another to simply brush aside the academic discussion of those who consider there to be a rationally moral case against the dictates of Islam, as prejudiced. Perhaps they are mistaken, but they are not prejudiced, and as such they are not Islam-o-phobic. There’s a very big and very real difference between thinking black people have tails; and thinking that Sharia law is incompatible with the post-enlightenment values of the West. By tarring those who attempt to enter into real, rational, debate over these undeniably controversial issues with the same brush that one applies to moronic, genuinely prejudiced thugs; both our intellectual and moral high-ground is lost.

 Many people do hold positions which we find abhorrent. I find the recent governmental decision to allow ‘faith’ schools to teach their students that homosexuality is wrong to be utterly despicable. I wonder why, if such backwards prejudice against homosexual people is allowed to be sanctioned in schools, it doesn’t also apply to the condemnations to hell of other ‘faith-groups’ which is certainly as well supported (if not far more so) in the relevant holy books. On the other hand, I hold the position that any animal able to feel pain should have the same right to exemption from it as humans. This would entail an end to vivisection. Many find this position abhorrent. The correct reaction to this divergence of positions is not post-modern subjectivism: the nihilistic; depressing; and irrational notion that there is no fact of the matter, and that as such we shouldn’t waste our time thinking about it (just believe whatever you feel like believing), but neither is it the equally irrational ‘morally righteous’ outrage of nublasphemy, where certain subjects are considered simply off-limits for discussion, and where the only acceptable response is an unquestioning acceptance of the standard opinion.

Rational discussion is what is needed. There is so much more wait to a condemnation of some cruel enterprise on the back of a rigorous and water-tight rational case than simply riding on the fury of some religious cry for prohibition. If holocaust denial; opposition to Islam; vivisection; faith schools; vegetarianism; anything whatsoever is genuinely right or wrong, then there will be a rational case for saying so, and formulating such a case will not only go some way to securing us against reoccurrence of error; it will also place us deservedly back on the intellectual and moral high-ground; whilst providing our children with a true example of how a civilised post-enlightenment society functions at the same time.

 

*http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/alabaster/A676424

North Korea’s New Pirate Radio Station

To most people in Britain, North Korea’s firing of a ballistic missile, which entered Japan’s sovereign territory, will not be big news. Indeed, a quick scan of the ‘comments’ sections on the various websites reporting the story demonstrates the usual ‘liberal’ response: that the US et al. have no right to interfere in the affairs of another country; or that since the UK and the US test their own missiles, they can’t condemn others who do the same. Now I’m a liberal myself – but I try to embody the rational and progressive attitude that that ideology is supposed to entail. I don’t, on the contrary, and as many ‘liberals’ do – just hold up the various liberal precepts as unquestionable rules that need to be maintained without consideration – regardless of the context.

So let’s consider the North Korean situation at present. Here we have a leader, Kim Jong-Il (of Team America fame) who continuously acts in a provocative manner – seemingly unconcerned (or wishing to be seen as such) by the condemnations; concerns; and fears of his neighbours and the international community at large. He has spoken of war with the US, with South Korea and with Japan. He has maintained daunting links with Iran’s equivalently monstrous leader. And he has turned his nose up at many attempts to calm hostilities and tension in the region. This latest ballistic missile launch was spoken about publicly on North Korean television (under the thin-guise of ‘space exploration’ tests), and warned against (by the US and Japan) before its recent launch. Did this concern North Korea? Apparently it did not, as the launch took place – making its way over Japan’s territory, demonstrating North Korea’s lack of fear at any international response.

Now, as some will inevitably say: what’s the problem? The missile wasn’t armed as a weapon, and it did not strike any target. How does this differ from any missile test conducted by the US or Britain herself? Well, one would do well to put themselves in Japan’s position – a country constitutionally lacking a military and therefore utterly reliant on the US for protection. When a neighbour known to harbour antagonistic feelings towards you fires a ballistic missile over your territory, despite your prior warnings that they were not sanctioned to do so, fear and a desire for swift action are understandable reactions. Consider if an army-less Britain, with deep seated antipathy between herself and France, was forced to watch a French missile – capable of harbouring terrible destructive power – sail through Britain’s sovereign skies. Would the British response then be one of ‘live and let live’? Add to this alternative scenario a religiously fanatical Germany, who eagerly observes the French launch in consideration of how best to utilise these abilities for their own schemes and you have a cocktail of utter terror for the British people, and indeed any persons who might face France’s wrath. This is the situation in Japan, only with North Korea in France’s place; and Iran in Germany’s. A madman, apathetic at the prospect of provoking his neighbours, and an even madder man, filled with the religious certainty that his actions will fulfil God’s holy word. Are these people we should remain stand-offish with? Would we if Britain were in danger? Did we?

The all carrot and no-stick approach will not work here with a man eager to play an all-defect game of prisoner’s dilemma. Sanctions must be put in place, and international condemnation must ring loud and clear. The question of whether Japan should rearm should be an open one: despite how great a shame it would be if she were forced to do so. In years to come, war may be a very real possibility, and Japan may do well to prepare for the worst. Though it seems likely, in the face of China and Russia’s pussy-footing, that little or no action will be taken against North Korea – at the least this should be a wake up call to the world that a terrifying and religiously fearless man is in our midst – and that the best response is not liberal self-hate.

‘Don’t Look At My Bricks!’ – Why Google Street View is Not Big Brother

As Google Street View launches, so do the reignited wails of the privacy rights brigade. Don’t misunderstand me – privacy rights are incredibly important, and should be maintained to the full extent possible (I don’t want you weirdoes knowing my address). It’s not for defending genuine privacy rights that I pour scorn on these hysterical individuals. No, my problem is with the craziness; the religiosity; the crusade like fashion, in which these people raise their irrational voices at any given opportunity, no matter how slight. But perhaps I’m getting ahead of myself – allow me to briefly explain what Google Street View is.

GSV is a new service offered by Google which allows the user to view a 3D layout of various selected world cities from the street level perspective. The images are not real time, but they are photographic, taken from a vast stock Google compiled a number of months back. In terms of practical application, it seems the main draw is the mere recreational pleasure of being able to see a real-life city in three dimensions on your computer screen, however the application could be useful in planning a route – allowing a user to see the shops they’ll pass, for example, and generally making it possible to walk a ‘test run’ without having to open your own front door.

So what do the privacy police imagine the problem is? Let’s attempt to take their case at its strongest. Is there any chance that unscrupulous individuals could somehow gain insider information on you or your property by using GSV? Not really, Google seem to have eliminated this possibility more or less entirely both by not running GSV in real time (so no risk of watching you leave the house), and by allowing anybody to ‘opt-out’ of the application and have their houses removed if they so desire. But could burglars perhaps use GSV to assess the security features of your house? Well, no. At least no more so than they could simply by walking passed your house (which is in a public location, after all), and if you’re really worried, as mentioned you can always have your house removed from view. Could people use GSV to watch your kids / stalk you / tell when you’re on holiday? No, no and no, because, as mentioned, it’s not in real time. So to reiterate the point, what on earth could be the problem?

There has been some mention of people being caught in the wrong place at the wrong time in the photographs that make up GSV. For instance, apparently there are images of men leaving sex shops, clearly in view. Granted, this is embarrassing (I’m usually so careful!), however there is no law against taking photographs in public locations and these unfortunate people were implicitly accepting the risk of being seen when they opted to conduct their embarrassing behaviour (whatever it may be) in a public location. This being so, Google really should be under no legal obligation to remove these people from view in GSV, however I’m sure that pure and simple human kindness would render them more than obliging to blur faces should any individual contact Google with the appropriate location information. However this is the key point here – everything featured in GSV is in public – visible to anyone who wishes to go and take a look, live! The notion that one’s privacy is being invaded by an application which depicts only the public is oxymoronic and utterly insane.

Why is this so often a feature of the cries of the privacy police? Take CCTV cameras – one of their biggest beefs. None of the CCTV cameras the PPs object to are in private locations. They fully accept one’s right to up security by placing a CCTV camera in one’s corner shop, for example. No, the trouble cameras are those placed by the government, in public, particularly in crime prone locations. What’s the problem? Were you planning on some light shop lifting; or a spot of GBH? Of course not – in which case you have nothing to worry about. Scared of getting caught picking your nose? Stop it then, it’s filthy. Would it be an issue to the PPs if every CCTV camera were replaced by a police officer? If not then what, I ask, could possibly be the issue with them? “But it’s just like Big Brother though, ain’t it?” – well no, it’s not, although it’s shocking how often this kind of statement gets spouted by the PPs, like some faithful mantra for those who can’t quite come up with an actual reason for their righteous outrage. In ‘1984’, Big Brother really was invading your privacy. ‘Ingsoc’ really did have an eye on you in your home, and in your private dealings. Orwell’s dystopian vision was not one in which county councils saved expenses (which could therefore be put to good use elsewhere) by putting up security cameras in shopping centres instead of hiring hundreds of policemen to do the same job.

We must be careful not to worship our liberal values – applying them where they are unsuited or unnecessary. If privacy is to be defended, it should be due to the rational rigour of one’s argument, not simply because it falls within the default reaction to the stock sentiment ‘privacy is good’. If there is something wrong with GSV, let’s hear your rational case for saying so, not simply an automated outrage response to it. Liberal society is an infinite improvement on conservative; faithful ones. Let’s not slip into the same dogmatic mindset as those systems – our values must always remain rational, not religious.

Why I Am A Vegetarian

To the general public vegetarianism is often placed, in terms of ethical respectability, next to such non-issues as working on Sundays; being fruitarian; and respecting the predictions of horoscopes. That is to say that though few would restrict one’s right to be vegetarian, most view it as a ‘personal choice’, with no objective backing, and to which they themselves are under no obligation to conform. To contrast this, consider the very real ethical issues of paedophilia; murder; and theft. There are few that question the legitimacy of objectively condemning those who undertake these practices, both morally and legally. Does vegetarianism deserve its place in the ‘personal choice’ category, or should it be moved to the domain of objective ethical imperatives? My position is that it should be moved due to the weight of reason in favour of doing so – and here I intend on setting this out.

To be fair, the so-called ‘animal rights lobby’ don’t do themselves any favours to the end which I’m advocating. Rarely, outside of philosophical ethics (which the vast majority are utterly oblivious to) does one find a rational defence of animal rights offered up. More often, the strategy is simply to lay on the cuteness, contrasted with the disgusting imagery of animal abuse in the meat industry / fur farm / circus etc. The fact that this imagery alone does speak to us should be telling, however without intellectual rigour, it is far from a good defence for objective insistence on the prevention of causing animal suffering. Granted, the same strategy is played out by most protectionist charities (think images of starving children for Amnesty International; or crying babies for NSPCC), but that only works because there are few that question (or consider at all) the legitimacy of defending these other humans. The fact that it doesn’t even occur to most people to wonder whether they are morally liable for not being vegetarian renders these animal rights appeals with the sentiment that if one can view them and remain apathetic, then that’s fine. My case is that, ethically speaking, one is required to be vegetarian, whether or not they care about non-human animals, just as every paedophile is ethically required to abstain from abusing children whether or not he cares about their interests.

So why is one ethically obligated to be vegetarian? The fundamental case comes from Princeton University philosopher Peter Singer, set out in his famous book: ‘Animal Liberation’. Though Singer doesn’t do so, for clarity, I’m going to state the argument in premise form as follows:

1.      It is unethical to cause unnecessary suffering, in any case.

2.      Non-human animals suffer.

3.      Therefore: (from (1) and (2)) it is unethical to cause unnecessary suffering to non-human animals.

That’s about as simple an argument as you can get, and unsurprisingly its premises are far from uncontroversial. It is logically sound however – if the premises (1) and (2) are true, then necessarily (logically necessarily), the conclusion (3) must be true in order to avoid a contradiction. So, are the premises true? As I have a lot to say about premise 1, I’ll briefly address premise 2. Most wont question the legitimacy of 2, it seems rather blatant both to common-sense and to science, that at least some animals can suffer – and that of that suffering subset, the ones we eat (pigs; cows; chickens etc.) are members. Indeed, there is conclusive scientific evidence that fish also feel pain, and so it seems that premise 2 would certainly apply to all the animals currently eaten; worn; and hunted by Westerners. There are some philosophers who would take issue with my use of the word ‘suffer’, which they define in a way that only applies to self-conscious beings such as humans (and some other ‘higher’ species). For them, simply read ‘suffer’ and ‘suffering’ as ‘pain’ and ‘experience of pain’, the argument still holds with that substitution.

So, to premise 1. Surely, if you are not vegetarian, this is the premise you would have been objecting to – and in my experience it could be for a number of different reasons. Usually, objections follow the formula: premise 1 applies to humans, but not non-humans because… [Some distinguishing feature between humans and non-humans]. As such, instead of writing this section in prose, I’m going to set it out under headers which will cover each of these different objections, with my response underneath. Hopefully this will also make the article more easily navigational, and allow those who are in agreement with me over some of the possible objections to merely skip my response to them as redundant.

1.     Premise 1 applies to humans, but not non-humans because… humans are more intelligent.

Is intelligence legitimate in distinguishing who should be caused suffering and who shouldn’t? Is this the way we rank our own society? Do we maintain a social order in which the more intelligent are more important, more deserving of protection, and more worthy of freedom from hurtful abuse? Of course we do not, but perhaps you meant to say that there is some intelligence boundary, to which all those above the boundary premise 1 applies, and to which all those below the boundary it doesn’t. We might wonder exactly why this would apply in ethical terms – as it is it seems rather arbitrary. Likewise, it’s ambiguous where this boundary line would be drawn since human intelligence varies greatly. Nevertheless it’s doomed to fail in any case since there are humans who are the equivalents or inferiors (intelligence wise) of some of the animals we currently take ourselves as free to cause suffering to. These humans include young infants and the severely mentally ill. Unless we wish also to remove these human’s right to premise 1, we will not be able to remain ethically consistent without applying premise 1 also to those animals which are their equivalents (or superiors, again intelligence wise). What about the potential of young infants? That will be covered later. How about the upset it would cause the families of severely mentally ill people? This renders severely mentally ill people only indirect ethical protection – they would have no claim to ethical defence for themselves – surely that’s not right? In addition, we need only imagine a case of an utterly disconnected severely mentally ill person, with no family, friends etc. Would this person be a legitimate target of suffering? Surely this human would have just as much of a claim as his peers who are lucky enough to have families. Thus this defence also fails.

2.     Premise 1 applies to humans, but not non-humans because… humans have morality, animals don’t.

The response to this is related to the response to 1 (above). It isn’t as arbitrary as it may seem: perhaps ethics works on a social contract basis, in which case one must be able to ‘enter into an agreement’ with the ethical system (not to break it), in order to legitimately claim defence from it (not to have others break it against you). Since animals lack the intellectual capacity to enter into this contract, they cannot be covered by the system. The problem again is that this would also exempt many humans including infants and the severely mentally ill, who also are unable to enter into agreement with the ‘ethical contract’. Thus, if we are to remain consistent, again we must either be vegetarian, or condemn these human ’marginal cases’ as legitimate targets for the same treatment as non-humans.

3.     Premise 1 applies to humans, but not non-humans because… all humans (marginal cases included) have, or had, the potential to be fully intellectually capable humans.

This is always a confusing one for me. What has ‘potential’ got to do with ethics? Both you and I are potential criminals – does that have any implications on how we should be ethically treated now? Likewise, all intellectually capable humans have the potential to be severely mentally handicapped – does that work in the same way as this defence, only in reverse? Nevertheless, let’s consider it as a legitimate distinction. Though infants aren’t currently the intellectual equivalents of adults, though they are in fact the current equivalents of some non-human animals, they have the potential to one day become fully intellectually capable adults. Likewise, the severely mentally ill once had the potential to be intellectually capable, but failed to do so for one reason or another. No non-human animal has the potential to become the intellectual equivalent of a normal adult human, and so that’s why premise 1 doesn’t apply to them. I expect this ‘potential’ argument may sound as ludicrous to you as it does to me, but regardless, let me answer it anyway with a thought-experiment. Take a pig in our universe, pig 1. By this argument, as pig 1 lacks the potential to become the intellectual equivalent of a regular adult human, premise 1 does not apply to him. Now, consider another possible universe, where everything is the same aside from the fact that, through scientific genius, we now have the technology to genetically modify pig brains to raise them to the same intellectual standard of normal humans. Take a pig in this universe that hasn’t been treated with this revolutionary technology, pig 2. Intellectually; bodily; in every way that matters, pig 2 is the equivalent of pig 1 in our universe only that thanks to the existence of the brain engineering technology in this possible universe, pig 2 has the potential to be the intellectual equivalent of a normal adult human. Does pig 2 therefore have premise 1 apply to him where pig 1 doesn’t, despite the fact that they’re more or less identical, and certainly equivalent in intellectual capacity? It’d be utterly arbitrary to say so and thus this defence too must fail.

4.     Premise 1 applies to humans, but not non-humans because… just because! Because humans are human and non-humans… aren’t!

If this seems too ridiculous a response to ever come up, try entering a few discussions on this subject. I wager it’ll come up fairly quickly. Is there anything to say for it? Not really. There can be nothing implicit in the word ‘human’ here. It can’t be shorthand for ‘intellectually superior’; ‘morally capable’; or ‘having potential’ since we’ve already eliminated those possibilities. Thus, ‘human’ really just means: ‘human’ – stripped of any possible legitimate distinctions with other species, and left only with the brute reality that ‘homosapiens’ are a different species to all the others. As such, this defence merely states a prejudice – it applies to humans but not animals because humans are humans and animals are animals, exactly equivalent to stating the superiority of whites to blacks because whites are whites and blacks are blacks. This being the case, it’s just as irrational and more importantly, just as morally condemnable as any other prejudice.

Now let me cover some other responses which don’t fit the aforementioned formula.

5.     It’s natural: we’re carnivores / omnivores!

The first thing to say here is that we’re certainly not carnivores – none of us – not even those meat headed men who consider themselves ‘alpha males’ because they eat lots of flesh and act like brutes and thugs. We also may not be omnivores. There are several signs implying this including our long intestines (where meat eaters have short intestines so the flesh doesn’t rot inside them); our flat teeth which are useless for meat eating; and the vegetarianism (or near vegetarianism in Chimpanzee’s case) of our nearest related species. Nevertheless, whether or not we’re biologically omnivorous or not has no bearing on my response to this defence. Instead, let me ask: what has nature got to do with ethics? If something is natural does that make it intrinsically ethical? And vice versa, is everything unnatural intrinsically unethical? Does this mean that if we discover paedophilia to be a natural human urge it becomes ethically legitimate? And does it mean that we should outlaw the use of medicine as immoral on the grounds that it’s not natural for us to do so? Of course not – the naturalness of something is ethically neutral – if something is ethical or unethical, it has no basis whatsoever on whether or not that thing is natural. This is the same faulty reasoning that led to social-Darwinism and, in short, is nonsense.

6.     We’re humans, so we’re loyal to our own species. I defend human babies while eating pigs because the human baby is the same species as me. It’s as simple as that.

We’re getting into really crazy territory here. This response is very similar to 4 above, but different in that it recognises the supposed legitimacy of other animals acting in the same way for their species. In theory, someone employing this defence would see a bear’s killing of a hiker as ‘fair-enough’ on the basis that the bear is part of the ‘bears team’, and the hiker is part of the ‘humans team’. Just to remind you, I have met ALL these responses at one time or another, and I’ve met this one twice – once from an otherwise very intelligent person who I imagine wouldn’t have made the same kind of laughable reasoning blunder in an argument he had less invested in. What can one say to this? Perhaps best to answer with another thought-experiment. Imagine if sometime in the future, we made contact with an alien species. Suppose that the alien species was almost exactly equivalent to us in terms of technological development and intellectual capacity. Would we approach these aliens in the same way that we currently approach bears? It seems extraordinarily unlikely that we would, and yet this is precisely what the defendant of argument 6 would have us do. Why? Because no matter how similar these aliens are to us, they are still on the ‘aliens team’, while we are on the ‘humans team’. As such, our killing of them, and their killing of us, would be totally ethically legitimate because of our differing respective loyalties (just as our killing of bears and their killing of us was legitimate for the same reason above). Of course, as mentioned earlier, this isn’t how we’d treat the aliens. If we didn’t instantly go to war with them (which is a very real possibility), we’d likely treat them, ethically, the same way we treat humans – and this would be on the back of one of the reasons above (so reread them if necessary). Nevertheless, we wouldn’t act as argument 6 stipulates, and so unsurprisingly, we can discount it as rubbish.

7.     So if animals deserve equivalent ethical treatment to us, shouldn’t we be giving them the vote / letting them drive cars / some other inappropriate activity?

The short answer is ‘no’, obviously not. Can I defend this rationally? Certainly. Men and women both deserve equivalent ethical treatment – does this mean that men should have the right to an abortion? Or that no-one should prevent women checking into hospital for testicular cancer? Likewise, ten year old children and adults both deserve equivalent ethical treatment. Does this mean that every ten year old boy should be able to do everything his dad does, including taking the Jag for a spin? When we acknowledge that two things are ethically equivalent, we understand that this only applies in the areas where the two things are equally ethically applicable. Both humans and pigs can suffer pain, and as such, both ethically deserve freedom from it (or freedom from having it caused to them). On the contrary, pigs lack the necessary reasoning capacity to enter into political selection procedures, and as such, only humans ethically deserve the freedom to vote. Thus, this attempt at a reductio ad absurdum also falls short.

8.     If it’s wrong to cause unnecessary suffering to animals then we should be taking measures to prevent their suffering in the wild, from killing and eating each other for example, shouldn’t we?

No we shouldn’t, fundamentally because we can’t. If we were to attempt such a grand rescue mission it would, without a shadow of a doubt, cause infinitely more suffering than would occur if we stayed out of it. This is due to the fact that firstly, there are too many variables for us to follow in ensuring we didn’t make a mess, and secondly because – due to the horrifying cruelty of nature, we’d be sacrificing one half of the population of animals in rescuing the other, not to mention the suffering that would follow population explosions in herbivorous species. In reality, there are many reasons why this would be unfeasible in attempting to bring about our intended end. Does this mean that you should let your dog maul next door’s cat if he catches him wandering round the garden? Absolutely not. You have brought your dog into that environment, you provide him with food, and you will patently not be preventing any suffering in allowing him to shred your neighbour’s kitten. Likewise, you won’t be causing any suffering in stopping him (since you are not denying him a needed meal, nor messing up an ecosystem). If your dog does kill next doors cat, it’s your ethical responsibility, not his (he hasn’t got any).

9.     I like meat.

I think I’ve covered everything here. If anything else comes to mind, I’ll add it at a later date – however, I hope I’ve been fairly comprehensive in my treatment (2890 words so far). Finally, let me address this – by far the most common response. This isn’t usually offered up as a serious argument. Rather, it’s thrown in after all other arguments have failed as a comical last word. Nevertheless, I suspect that quite a few people semi-consciously take it as a half legitimising reason to keep doing what they’re doing – in the same way that people justify not bothering making an effort with maths because they think its funny that they’re so bad at it. Is there ANYTHING it does for the non-vegetarian? I’m afraid not. Apologies for returning to the stock example, but the fact that paedophiles like touching children doesn’t make it any less ethically abominable. In a world where paedophilia was acceptable, we’d surely meet many of them stating: “I know I shouldn’t, but, you know – I just like kids!” That sounds awful, because it is. Should ‘”I like meat” sound any less awful? If one considers what ‘meat’ entails – the intense suffering involved in creating every single little bit of it – then surely we must agree that it should not.

Vegetarians and animal rights defenders have a serious PR problem. We’re seen as sentimental and irrational, and in possession of confused priorities. That is not an image that I accept. I fully support animal rights, and I hold that we have just as much of an ethical obligation to be vegetarian (and to not cause unnecessary suffering) as we do not to steal; kill; or rape. For those who agree with me, please realise the importance of a rational image – and try to uphold it. For those who disagree, please consider whether you have genuinely legitimate reasons for doing so before discounting me – though it’s perfectly possible that I’m wrong, it’s just as possible you (and all your friends and family) are. We must not forget that even a practice as obviously unethical as slavery was once commonly accepted by all but a few.