Living in the thrall of a post-modern (or perhaps even post-post-modern) society, it is difficult for regular people; even relatively clever regular people, to know what to believe and upon what basis to do so. In a climate which condemns criticism of other’s beliefs; sometimes even going so far as to call the very notion of objectivity a Western imperialistic anachronism, upon what grounds can one base their thinking? Couple this relativistic mind-set with the fact that the sheer level of complexity in modern human technology; science; and logic has reached such a high degree that to understand even one tiny corner of human-expertise takes years of difficult study, and to grasp all of it is a temporal impossibility. What then is the answer? Should we do as many already have and resign ourselves to the notion that we can never really know anything; and that therefore every claim – no matter how fantastical – is equally valid (some would even say: equally true)? Or is it still possible to rationally believe things about the world, thereby necessarily considering competing claims false?
I’m not going to focus on refuting relativism in this article. That’s been done to death – so much so in-fact that I would imagine the notion that relativism is a tenable position now exists only in the minds of laypeople (and how could any still actually existent relativist disagree with that claim anyway, given their thesis?). Rather, I will be focusing on the far more pressing and real issue of how a layperson can reasonably believe (or disbelieve) complex claims, despite neither knowing about; nor understanding, what makes them true (or false).
That might sound like a contradiction. How can one reasonably believe something when one doesn’t grasp the reasonable grounds for holding it to be true? This is precisely the thinking of those who hold that the correct position on evolution; or climate change (and to a lesser extent, on God or morality), is one of agnosticism. In their heads they follow the following line of thought: “I don’t have the slightest idea about ‘claim A’, nor what evidence exists for or against it, and indeed nor how that evidence should be interpreted. Because I lack this understanding, I myself can neither reasonably refute those who support ‘claim A’, nor those who oppose it. Thus, my only choice is to neither accept nor reject ‘claim A’, and to consider its supporters, and its detractors, as equal”. Such thinking can appear very compelling, and thus any alternative can seem instantly dogmatic and unreasonable. This need not be the case.
Naturally, whether the thinking above; which we’ll call the agnostic position, is reasonable or not will depend on a number of different factors: what kind of claim is ‘claim A’; on what kind of basis do its supporters support it, and its detractors detract it; and are there further considerations that should be borne in mind? If ‘claim A’ is the position that ‘chocolate is nicer than cheese’, then arguably the agnostic position is the right one (easy cheese-lovers). Those that prefer chocolate to cheese do so because the taste of chocolate is favourable when they’re eating it; while those who prefer cheese detract from the claim because the taste of cheese is favourable when they’re eating that – but there really is no objective fact of the matter about whether it’s chocolate or cheese that IS more favourable when eaten – the very existence of the supporters and the detractors in this case refutes the claim. ‘Chocolate is nicer than cheese’ for those who prefer the taste of chocolate to cheese, and vice versa for those who prefer the reverse.
What if ‘claim A’ is the position that ‘Allah is the one true god’? Here the aforementioned factors become all important. Is the disagreement between two laypeople? Or between scientists or philosophers? Likewise, though the question looks like an ontological claim about the real-world existence of a god, identifiable as the one referred to in the Quran; in many cases this isn’t really how people treat a claim like this. Often it’s instead taken as something like ‘it would be beneficial if people believed that Allah was the one true god’. Thus we must also consider whether one or both sides is using scientific and philosophical arguments; or whether they’re arguing on the basis of religious texts; or by pointing out how people would be socially better or worse off if they believed Allah was the one true god? Given the many different forms that this argument could take, we’d have to first define the parameters of the debate before we reasonably assess how to judge it – something which is rarely spelt out when questions like this are posed at staged debates, usually resulting in them being a waste of time.
So what if the claim is both undeniably objective, and has its parameters clearly set – a scientific or philosophical claim? Suppose ‘claim A’ equates to ‘evolution is scientific fact’. Now consider again the aforementioned agnostic position. For the sake of argument – imagine you have no understanding of evolution; you don’t know the evidence in favour of it (or against it); and you can neither refute evolution’s supporters, nor its detractors. Do you now have no choice but to take up an agnostic position on evolution? No you do not, so long as you again consider the important factors. The so-called debate between evolution’s supporters and detractors is really nothing of the sort. One side employs genuine scientific argument, where the other utilises a mishmash of pseudo-science; exploited misunderstanding; quote-mining; emotive coercion; and slander. Moreover, taking into account surrounding considerations, we have the knowledge that evolution’s detractors are almost universally already enthralled to religious positions which (so they understand) require evolution to be false – thus they are hardly able to approach the position from an objective and neutral scientific standpoint. But what if you don’t even know that? What if you can’t distinguish creationist pseudo-science from genuine science? Even so, you are still able to rationally side with the proponents of the claim that ‘evolution is scientific fact’. How? By deferring to the relevant authority.
Such a claim will send shivers down the spine of any philosophically savvy reader. Is this not the fallacy of authority? No, it isn’t – for the following reason. One may not be aware of the huge amount of data relevant to evolutionary science; nor of the practical methods applied in testing and assessing it, but one is aware of the scientific methodology – the fundamental principles of good science – used by those who do understand evolutionary data. So long as one is aware of scientific methodology, can understand how it works as an objectively applicable method of discovering truth, and can be confident that the proponents (or detractors) of a claim are exclusively utilising it in their case – one can reasonably support that case despite not understanding the nitty-gritty details themselves. Indeed, it’s on this basis that the entire scientific infrastructure works. As science has exponentially grown in complexity, experts have become increasingly specialised, to the point at which it’s possible that one PhD level scientist can possess no-better than a layperson’s understanding of his colleagues work. If that first scientist wishes to use knowledge gained from his peer’s research, he can do so not because he understands the research itself, but because he knows that his peer gained that knowledge using the scientific method; coupled with his understanding of how the scientific method leads to truth.
What then of climate change? Unlike the evolutionary ‘debate’ – a battle between scientists and the religious or scientifically-confused, climate change appears to be a clash of scientists vs. scientists. How, as laypeople, are we to handle this case? With lesser confidence than with evolution, we have no choice but to again appeal to the authority of the experts (though in an importantly different way). Though climate change-sceptics may well be genuine scientists; and may also gain their data off the back of the scientific method – they are undeniably the overwhelming minority within the applicable scientific community[1]. If the vast majority of those who understand the data, and exclusively apply the scientific method in rationally reaching their conclusions, hold that human activity is a significant contributor to climate change – then we, who do not understand the data, but who do understand the scientific method; and can reasonably assume that it’s being exclusively applied[2], can rationally side with them. That’s not to mention the surrounding consideration of the suspect links between some climate change-sceptics and certain oil corporations.
Thus – just as one can reasonably take the medicine their doctor has given them, despite having no idea how it works – we can remain confident in scientific claims even if we don’t understand the nitty-gritty details of them ourselves. We do not have to remain agnostics in all areas for which we lack expertise; and we can still say with confidence that not everybody’s position is equally valid. For our part – we should ensure that we do understand the basics, like the scientific method; and learn the very important differences in the methodologies of scientists and philosophers, and theologians; politicians; and journalists. To rationally defer to an authority, you must be aware of what reasonably makes that person an authority in the first place; and you must also bear in mind that authority’s limits: a scientist is not necessarily an authority on ethics; and indeed – a geologist is no authority on evolution. Bear all that in mind, and we need not be a world of shoulder-shrugging agnostics.
[1] From Wikipedia: “A poll performed by Peter Doran and Maggie Kendall Zimmerman at Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Illinois at Chicago received replies from 3,146 of the 10,257 polled Earth scientists. Results were analyzed globally and by specialization. 76 out of 79 climatologists who “listed climate science as their area of expertise and who also have published more than 50% of their recent peer-reviewed papers on the subject of climate change” believe that mean global temperatures have risen compared to pre-1800s levels, and 75 out of 77 believe that human activity is a significant factor in changing mean global temperatures. …
A summary from the survey states that: It seems that the debate on the authenticity of global warming and the role played by human activity is largely nonexistent among those who understand the nuances and scientific basis of long-term climate processes” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_opinion_on_climate_change#Doran_and_Kendall_Zimmerman.2C_2009
[2] Scientific infrastructure is extremely strict in ensuring this is the case, and enforces right application via the peer-review system.
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11/04/2010 at 11:21 pm
simonkaye
Interesting stuff.
It occurs to me that the principle of accepting a position on the basis of the rigour and methodology of its proponents (as opposed to basing acceptance upon a working understanding of the position itself) is not necessarily always going to work, particularly (and unfortunately) in the case of science.
The strength of scientific methodology, and the grounds for the near-universal acceptance of the products of scientific thought (when it suits us), is that it is fully admissive of the ignorance of its own practitioners. A scientist who isn’t a fallibilist is ultimately not a scientist at all. So, to come back to your argument, we’re left with a statement a bit like “I know nothing of A but I accept A on the grounds that those who propone A are terribly honest about the gaps in their own knowledge,” which is a bit weaker.
If I were a purist – a difficult, hateful purist – I would put forward the argument that a real scientist never proposes or recommends anything at all, but draws a narrow conclusion from an originally tested hypothesis, publishes it, and sees what becomes of it. Things certainly seem to fall apart when scientists have axes to grind (just ask the UEA).
Better, as you say, to be educated or to educate ourselves, and to develop our own positions.
11/04/2010 at 11:58 pm
damntheirlies
Though I’m certain that you will have fully understood me, Simon, for the sake of clarifying a possible misinterpretation of your comment: I’m not suggesting that one should accept scientific claims on the basis that one favours the rigorous methodology of science as fact-reeping; I’m making the slightly further removed claim that one remains RATIONAL in holding to affirmed complex scientific positions (that they don’t understand) as one DOES understand the methodology utilised to reach those claims, and HOW that methodology is fact-reeping (not a coined phrase I’m proud of).
Now you are of course completely correct about everything you’ve said there concerning scientific methodology; the scientific mindset; and the scientist’s extremely tentative approach towards positions, and heavy reluctance to apply notions of factuality. In Popperian terms – a scientific ‘fact’ is just one that has yet to be falsified (not that I’m suggesting Popper has the last word on methodology – he doesn’t).
I’m not suggesting that laypeople should hold any stronger confidence in scientific positions than the scientists do themselves. Evolution is not an ‘unfalsified position’ to scientists, and a ‘scientific truth’ to lay people. Rather, I’m suggesting that a layperson can be exactly equally rational as a zoologist who accepts the theory of evolution (however we want to breakdown that ‘acceptance’), despite the fact that the zoologist understands WHY evolution is ‘true’ (worth ‘accepting’), while the layperson doesn’t; so long as the layperson understands the methodology upon which the scientific claims are made.
Naturally, it would be preferable if we DID all have the time; effort; and intellectual capacity to be able to become fully qualified experts in every field of human endeavour – but as we do not, it is a vital ‘second best’ that we can remain rational on the backs of our human peers who DO possess expertise. In short, we don’t need to see what we believe in order to rationally believe it.